ABSTRACT: This paper seeks to clarify the relationship between Locke's political and religious thought. To the extent that Locke's political thought is an outgrowth of a particular strand of Christianity, its claims to universality would be significantly diminished. This would be the case, however, only if Locke were genuinely religious. Plausible accounts of his religiosity have been offered by Dunn, Waldron, et al., but such accounts become implausible given the presence of a biblical critique within the Two Treatises. The evidence for a critique of the Bible on moral grounds pointed to by Strauss, Pangle, et al. is ambiguous, however, and so fails to refute the pious-Locke hypothesis. This paper argues that close attention to Locke's analysis of the Hebrew text of Gen. 1:28 unambiguously points to a critique of the Bible on textual grounds. This serves to set the moral critique upon firmer foundations, to imply that the moral critique really is present in the text, and to reestablish the universalist claims of Locke's political thought.
The interpretation of this evidence can be questioned, however. In saying that we learn the same thing whether we consult reason or revelation, the effect of Locke's statement is to replace appeals to revelation with reasoned argumentation, it is urged. One must not understate the importance of the fact that the Essay Concerning Human Understanding was prompted by a rejection of traditional natural law theology. The theology of the Reasonableness of Christianity and the Paraphrase and Notes is a watered-down Christianity; the intention of both works is instead to transform or corrupt, not purify, Christianity so that it is safe for liberal democracy. Locke's discussions of the biblical God demonstrate the distance between the authentic biblical teaching and Locke's own rational politics. How, then, do we know that the things that Locke says are not authentically pious? Scholars who argue these points are not satisfied that a deeply serious thinker could hold to the theology that is attributed to him and that he sometimes seems to support. Locke's theology is unworthy of Locke, a statement that rests upon a divination of what a serious theology must look like.
In both cases, the question turns on whether we find Locke's theology satisfying. Now, this is without doubt the more important question, but it does not advance the discussion concerning what Locke himself thought. Both sides begin with the supposition that Locke's thought is reasonable, but disagree when it comes to what is in fact reasonable. It is quite possible that Locke was not simply wise. In any case, such arguments require that we be wise, at least when it comes to theological issues.
-4 -The presence of a biblical critique within the Two Treatises would certainly invalidate the pious-Locke hypothesis. 7 The problem arises in finding evidence that incontrovertibly points to the presence of such a critique. While evidence for the incompatibility between Locke's thought and authentic Christian belief has been presented in a variety of different ways, the primary argument that Locke's First Treatise is actually a theologico-political treatise takes the form of discovering within it a moral critique of religion. This does not rise to the level of incontrovertibility, however, for the evidence that points toward such a critique establishes only that Locke was either irreligious or that he was incoherent, but it does not enable us to decide between the two.
So, for example, Pangle's Locke objects that the biblical God casts man into a world where he needs to labor in order to survive but forbids or discourages the most productive means toward that survival (viz. eating meat, farming, acquisitiveness in general). The biblical God commands submission to the patriarchal family, while the rational family is not patriarchal.
The doctrine of original sin itself is morally grotesque. In short, the biblical God is a monster. At the same time, however, the personal experiences of the pious suggest the importance and even centrality of divine justice to their experience of the divine. It is their experiences, and perhaps similar ones of our own, that make us willing to take the Bible seriously in the first
place. An unjust God, then, can be no God at all; ancient tales that suggest we must 7 Even though several competing and incompatible theologies have been attributed to Locke in attempts to make sense of what he says, such that we must speak of pious-Locke hypotheses, in the plural, I will refer to them as a group since they share the common characteristic of denying that Locke's piety was as deep as a coat of paint.
subordinate our rational sense of justice to divine authority can thus be known to be false. This is what Pangle says Locke argues.
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The question remains, however, whether Locke applied (or meant the reader to apply)
what he says about justice to the actions he attributes to God. Moreover, that such a moral critique is present in Locke's text seems to be persuasive only to those who find the moral critique itself persuasive. Those willing to insist that even God's justice is mysterious, on the other hand, or those who just don't care about religious truth tend not to see the evidence to which Pangle points. They could retort that Locke wrestled with the justice of God and so that is why God might not always seem to some to come off well.
The evidence that could decide the plausibility of the pious-Locke hypothesis is likely to be arcane. The evidence this paper presents certainly is. The evidence for a biblical critique within the Two Treatises is arcane for three reasons. First, precisely if such a critique is concealed it will be difficult to see, though not impossible. Second, even if such a critique were stated openly, serious biblical critiques in general are arcane things. Third, a reason peculiar to us, the evidence in this case requires some knowledge of Hebrew.
Evidence of the sort that I am talking about must be such that it is incompatible with the pious-Locke hypothesis. Demonstrating this fact requires that I first attempt to interpret it in line with that hypothesis. Only then it is appropriate to go through the other interpretation. As a result, I will address some passages more than once.
Locke's reading of Gen. 1:28 in chapter four of the First Treatise is heterodox and peculiar to him (a fact that so far as I know has not been noted before however, saying he will examine both possibilities (I 24). First, he will show that God granted no power over other human beings in Gen. 1:28. Then he will show that God did not give Adam any particular property but rather that the donation was to the entire species. It is the first of these that has our attention.
Initial statement of the typology, I 25
Locke's argument is at once straightforward: "all positive Grants convey no more than the express words they are made in will carry," and the wording of Gen. 1:28 simply does not cover human beings (I 25). That verse reads, in the King James translation, "And God blessed them, and God said unto them, Be fruitful, and multiply, and replenish the earth, and subdue it, and have dominion over the fish of the sea, and over the fowl of the air, and over every living thing that moveth upon the earth."
This seems to be a problem, for the King James translation might give the impression that the grant does indeed cover human beings, insofar as Adam was given dominion over "every living thing that moveth." Human beings are of course living things that move. So Locke mentions a problem with the translation, deriving from the fact that the verse should conclude "every living thing that creepeth upon the earth."
The words in Hebrew for "living thing that creepeth" are ḥayah ha-romeset, Locke tells us, "of which words the Scripture it self is the best interpreter." And, as appears from Gen.
1:24-25, he assures us, these are technical terms. "Let the Earth bring forth the living Creature after his kind; Cattle and creeping thing, and beast of the Earth, after his kind, and God made the Beast of the Earth after his kind, and Cattle after their kind, and every thing that creepeth on the Earth after his kind." So, the brute inhabitants of the earth are called "living creatures,"
and these are split into three categories, Locke says: cattle (which can be tamed and thus owned), wild beasts, and creeping things, i.e., reptiles. The word for wild beast, Locke informs us, just happens to be the word for a living thing, ḥayah, and the word for creeping thing is haromeset. So the phrase in question, ḥayah ha-romeset, he concludes, should not have been translated by the King James as a noun followed by a relative clause at all ("living thing that creepeth," let alone "living thing that moveth") but instead as a list ("wild beast and reptile").
And this is how this verse is understood by the Septuagint, Locke says.
That is, all of creation is divided into categories and the donation in Gen. 1:28 must be read in light of these categories. On the fifth day God created the fish and the birds. On the sixth day, prior to the creation of man, He created the brute inhabitants of the earth, comprising the cattle, the wild beasts, and the reptiles. Looking to the wording of Gen. 1:28, the donation is in these same terms: fish of the sea, fowl of the air, wild beasts, and reptiles, none of which include human beings.
An objection to the typology, I 26
Given this argument, it might not be immediately clear why Locke must continue with I Most importantly, Locke is just wrong. Ḥayah ha-romeset is unmistakably a noun followed by a relative clause, which is why every single translation renders it as such (again, the Septuagint does not render this at all). In order to read "beast and reptile" the words would have to be ḥayah v'remes. (Actually, in order for Locke's typological thesis to be correct, they would have to be ḥayat ha-aretz v'ha-remes, but more on that later.)
There is, then, no avoiding the conclusion that Locke's reading is the heterodox one, the novel one, and a wrong one, so it is important to recognize that he is committed to defending it even when it gets him into further difficulties (as in I 26). We must wonder why.
Locke's heterodox interpretation as motivated by the deepest piety
We cannot attribute Locke's novel argument here to an immediate political desire to refute Filmer, as this heterodox interpretation is not necessary to the refutation of Filmer. His friend, James Tyrrell, knew that "every living thing that creepeth" cannot refer to human beings since humans do not "creep" anymore than they "slither" or "canter," in Hebrew as in English.
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Locke knew Hebrew, and moreover it is likely that he read Patriarcha non Monarcha as soon as it came out in 1681. He bought a copy of it for Tyrrell, which, if Laslett is correct that this suggests that Locke did not know who its author was, 12 at least demonstrates that he thought it worth reading.
We must then wonder why Locke would not rest satisfied with this argument. This wonder might be lessened if we recognize one objection to which Tyrrell's argument is vulnerable and the theological orientation from which that objection issues. To say that ramas (the verb from which ha-romeset is formed) cannot apply to human beings seems to beg the question. For, how do we know that it cannot apply to human beings? Such an argument should appeal to the word's use in Scripture. But, then, if Gen. 1:28 does include human beings, must
we not change our understanding of ramas? I do not know if this argument was actually made in print in reply to Tyrrell, but it is one that might have occurred to someone who was seriously pious, actually attempting to live according to Scripture and willing, should Scripture be sufficiently clear, to sacrifice even their most cherished political commitments. That is, this argument would occur to someone deeply interested in knowing whether Filmer is right or wrong about Gen. 1:28, someone not willing to cease inquiry as soon as they found a merely plausible answer that they happened to like.
So, let us pursue this possibility-that Locke desires to know for certain that ramas cannot include human begins and so for this reason hews to his position that the Bible speaks consistently in the categories established in Gen. 1:20-25, describing the work of the fifth and sixth days prior to the creation of man, despite the difficulties this causes for him and that he must resolve in I 26. A problem with this possibility is that Locke does not need to say that the categories announced in Gen. 1:20-25 are preserved in Gen. 1:26 and 28 in order to show that ramas, and thus ḥayah ha-romeset, is inapplicable to human beings. Locke, moreover, knows this, pointing us to the appropriate evidence. He does point to how the word is used in Scripture, unlike Tyrrell. Even if he is wrong about the precise meaning of the words, he concedes (presumably his identification of behemah with animals that can be tamed and thus owned, ḥayah with specifically wild beasts, and ha-romeset with reptiles), "they cannot be supposed to comprehend Man, *…+ especially since that Hebrew word remes *…+ is so plainly used in contradistinction to him," citing Gen. 6:20, 7:14, 7:21, 7:23, 8:17, and 8:19 (I 27) . So
Locke's motivation seems to be more than simply to establish the same point as Tyrrell makes, namely, that ramas cannot be used in conjunction with human beings.
What motivates Locke's heterodox interpretation, where Gen. 1:26 and 28 speak the same language as Gen. 1:20-25, then, seems to be that interpretation itself. What we get in I 25-27 is his pursuit of this thesis. Locke is certain that "all positive Grants convey no more than the express words they are made in will carry," that Gen. 1:28 is a positive grant, and that he must look to Scripture as "the best interpreter" of what those express words will carry. The best interpretation is that "which best agrees with the plain construction of the words, and arises from the obvious meaning of the place" (I 32). "God, I believe, speaks differently from Men, because he speaks with more Truth, more Certainty; but when he vouchsafes to speak to Men, I
do not think, he speaks differently from them, in crossing the Rules of language in use amongst them" (I 46). Locke is also certain that the Bible is listing the kinds of creatures that there are, it being emphasized that the "living creatures" are to be brought forth after their kinds, the cattle after its kind, the beast of the earth after its kind, and everything that creeps upon the earth after its kind. The Bible itself presents a typology of the fifth and sixth days' creations. There seems to be nothing subversive about the opening gambit of chapter four, then.
Pangle sees here "an impressively sober and conservative" beginning, and can reconcile this with his thesis that the First Treatise is actually Locke's theologico-political treatise only by suggesting that Locke begins this way in order to establish his pious bona fides with some, while preparing others to be suitably shocked when he abandons this pious approach to Scripture in giving his own spin on the commandment to be fruitful and multiply in I 33. 13 If anything, Locke's procedure here is too pious for Pangle's thesis, it being neither sober nor conservative but radical, and its radicalism seems promoted by a sincere desire to interpret the Bible.
13 Pangle, Spirit of Modern Republicanism, 141-42.
Locke Pushes the Typological Thesis Past the Breaking Point
Locke's attempt to interpret the Bible according to Scripture alone runs into an insuperable problem. To see why, let us consider his continuation of the argument in I 27-28.
The donation to Noah and the problem of cannibalism, I 27
To prove that the Bible does actually continue to speak in terms of the "kinds" mentioned in Gen. This is Locke's conclusion, even though this requires that he now concede that "all the words whereby they are expressed in the History of their Creation, are no where used in any of the following Grants, but some of them omitted in one, and some in another" (I 27 This is, however, a rather odd thing for Locke to claim, given the deeply pious claims he has made and will continue to make concerning biblical hermeneutics. The problem is not that he is maligning Filmer here, but rather that he is breaking the canons of interpretation upon which he insists in order to malign Filmer. "The Prejudices of our own ill grounded Opinions, however by us called Probable cannot Authorize us to understand Scripture contrary to the direct and plain meaning of the Words," he says (I 36). He appears to have taken these canons rather seriously. At the very least, the argument that Locke makes but that Tyrrell does not make (namely, that Gen. 1:28 is best understood to refer to the "kinds" enumerated in Gen.
1:20-25) seems comprehensible only if Locke were trying more genuinely than Tyrrell to follow these canons.
While the Bible clearly condemns murder (although if Filmer is correct it is not clear that a king could ever "murder" his subjects), its treatment of cannibalism is more that it is a ghoulish necessity that presses itself upon those in the most terrible of conditions and that God will visit that necessity upon Israel as punishment for its sins (Lev. 26:29, Deut. 28:53-57, Jer.
19:9, Ezek. 5:10). These verses do not say that Israel will warrant even further punishment for this, nor do they threaten in general that Israel will be led to commit further sins as a punishment for its sins. For example, they do not say that Israel will be so desperate that it will trap and eat the birds of prey or dogs that the siege will attract, things that are expressly forbidden. Of course, our incredulity at Locke's failure to notice a thing is not conclusive evidence that he did in fact notice that thing. What is certain is that at this point Locke is interpreting the Bible in a way that can be exploited by the moral critique. He has left aside the interpretive modes that seem immune to that critique, and he will continue to do so throughout the rest of the Two Treatises.
The typological thesis is alien to the Bible, I 28
In the next section, the last devoted to the question of whether the donation of Gen.
1:28 includes human beings before moving on to the question of whether that grant was made to Adam alone or to all mankind, or at least just to Adam and Eve jointly, Locke's thesis that the Bible continues to speak in terms of the "kinds" enumerated in Gen. 1:20-25 recedes. David lists the things over which God granted dominion: "all Sheep and oxen and the Beasts of the Field, and the Fowl of the Air, and Fish of the Sea, and whatsoever passeth through the paths of the Sea" (I 28; cf. Ps. 8:8-9). Locke limits his point to the fact that none of these can be taken to signify man, and thus that there was no "Monarchical Power of one Man over another" granted by Gen. 1:28. Crucially, David does not here speak in the terms Locke had identified as crucial.
"Beasts of the Field" (bahamot sadei) is built off of the term Locke had identified as "cattle" (behemah), so the Psalm would cover only various kinds of cattle, birds, and sea creatures, if we were to follow Locke's typological thesis.
If anything, Locke concludes his argument with a text that refutes the original argument that he had to make, after having brought that argument to a point that it seems untenable, and after having engaged in the sort of interpretation that he has and will continue to decry.
The only thing that can save the pious-Locke hypothesis is that he simply failed to notice these problems. Looking to the Bible itself, Locke's argument seems much more problematic even than I have just described. It is not simply his typological thesis that is in trouble, but his presentation itself.
Tearing Away the Veil
Locke concludes I 27 by saying that Noah and his sons were granted permission in Gen.
9:2 to eat "every Living thing that moveth," these being the same words as appear in Gen. 1:28. This is inaccurate, and probing that inaccuracy suggests that it is either a lie or that Locke has abandoned his argument, made just two sections earlier, that ḥayah ha-romeset is best understood as "wild beast and reptile."
Opening up the King James, we find that Gen. 9:3 (the only verse Locke can be referring to) instead reads, "every moving thing that liveth." Of course, if we accept that ḥayah haromeset is a noun followed by a relative clause, as every translator does (and, as a reminder, the only way to take the Hebrew), they do refer to the same thing: every living thing that creeps is the same as every creeping thing that lives. Tyrrell tells us that both verses refer to the same thing. But Locke has argued that it is wrong to take ḥayah ha-romeset as a noun followed by a relative clause; Tyrrell has not. Tyrrell can therefore say that they are the same thing; Locke cannot.
Locke tells us to look to the Hebrew words, that the Hebrew words are the same in both places (I 27 ll. 40-41). He implies that they are the same words as he says appear in Gen. 9:2, ḥayah and ha-romes (cf. I 27 ll. 1-9). He might even be said to more than imply this, as he claims that the grant to eat food is in Gen. 9:2 (I 27 l. 39-he knows better at I 27 l. 10, where he also suggests that only remes is mentioned in the grant to eat food). In any event, the relevant passage from Gen. 9:3 reads remes asher hu ḥai. These are quite simply different words, if words formed off of the same roots. Ḥai cannot here refer to wild beasts, however, it unmistakably being the verb "live."
So, while Locke's interpretation of Gen. 1:28 requires that we take the relative clause ha-romeset to instead be a noun, his reading of Gen. 9:3 requires the verb ḥai to be a noun, neither of which is permissible. One might perhaps speculate, if one wished to salvage the pious-Locke hypothesis by impugning Locke's command of Hebrew, that he was taken in by Spinoza, who in his Hebrew Grammar claimed that every verb can be a noun and every noun a verb. 15 Aside from the dark suggestion that Locke's guide to the Bible is Spinoza, it seems that Locke could not have taken this advice concerning Gen. 9:3, at least. Ha-is the definite pronoun, and one can construct relative clauses by placing it in front of a verb; this might make someone taken in by Spinoza think that such a verb is actually a noun. There would still be the problem of the missing and required to make ḥayah ha-romeset into "wild beast and reptile,"
but such an error is more plausible than attributing Locke's parallel error regarding Gen. 9:3 to this cause. This is because asher hu unmistakably introduces a relative clause, and so remes asher hu ḥai cannot possibly mean "reptile and wild beast," even accepting Spinoza's slip or deception regarding Hebrew grammar.
Errors such as these are unlikely. So, either Locke is now interpreting Gen. 1:28 in the same way as everyone else, having abandoned his own typological argument, or he is misleading us about the text of Gen. 9:3 (he certainly does so regarding the English, the only question being whether he intends to do so regarding the Hebrew, as well). Or, both are possible.
Prior to this point, Locke had been telling a host of lies, albeit small ones, in order to make his thesis that ḥayah ha-romeset in Gen. 1:28 refers to the "kinds" enumerated in Gen.
1:24-25 seem more plausible. It now seems worth nothing them. As noted above, while he does not quote the Hebrew words used in Gen. 9:3, he at the very least implies that these are the same ones as used in Gen. 9:2 for wild beast and reptiles, which he lists as ḥayah and ha-romes. The latter is actually tirmos, as in kol asher tirmos ha-adamah, "everything that creeps upon the earth," while the former is ḥayat ha-aretz. Ḥayah can be used to mean a wild beast, as Locke says, but on its own it means simply a living thing; the more common term for wild beast is literally "living thing of the land," ḥayat ha-aretz, which we find here. Similarly, Locke says that Gen. 1:24-25, upon which he relies for saying that the brute inhabitants of the earth are divided into three "kinds," use the word ḥayah for wild beast (I 25), when they too use the phrase ḥayat ha-aretz (or, the same things, ḥaito-eretz). He also suggests that these verses use ha-romeset for the third rank of creatures, the reptiles (I 25); the actual word is remes. I have already remarked on his falsifications regarding the Septuagint. Now, all of these falsification make it more plausible that ḥayah ha-romeset should be taken to mean "wild beast and reptile," but at the same time, once they are noticed, they reveal how utterly implausible Locke's suggestion actually is. While I have been giving Locke the benefit of the doubt, suggesting that the was led to his impossible position as a result of an honest error, driven by a pious desire that the biblical text be amenable to the sort of interpretive methods that submission to that text would require, it is impossible to maintain that Locke's errors were honest. 16 Especially in light of his abandonment of his typological thesis to say that Gen. 9:3 and Gen. 1:28 refer to the same thing (cf. I 27), we cannot say that Locke believes in this thesis. We are faced then with the inescapable conclusion that Locke presents in I 25 and defends in I 26 and the beginning of I 27 an interpretation of the Bible in which he does not believe.
More than this: he creates an interpretation in which he does not believe, a heterodox interpretation, and advances it only to abandon it. One might claim that someone unable to attain or maintain the austere saintliness required to interpret the Bible in the light of the Bible alone, refusing to bend Scripture to their own prejudices however cherished, might mouth the canons of interpretation while in practice departing from them, occasionally making claims that are supported solely by their cherished prejudices. Even the pious might slip when it comes to defending an interpretation to which they are attached. But it cannot be claimed that a genuinely pious individual would suffer from this regarding an interpretation to which they are not at all attached-not just to defend an interpretation in which they do not believe, let alone one that is not supported by the authorities, but to lie in order to defend an unpopular interpretation in which they do not believe. It cannot be claimed that a genuinely pious individual would act as Locke acts in I 25-28.
Locke's Trap
By the end of chapter four, Locke is interpreting the Bible entirely in the light of his own moral reasoning. Indeed, the contrast with the beginning of the chapter is striking. After concluding his textual case that Gen. 1:28 gave no political power (I 40), he entertains the possibility that the grant of property contained in it could be parlayed into political power by threatening all those who did not submit with starvation (I 41 Eve, for example, by asking, "shall we say that God ever made a joint Grant to two, and one only was to have the benefit of it?" (I 29). Locke's conclusive proof that Filmer is mistaken about the extent and character of Noah's dominion is Locke's own judgment that it would be absurd to put off re-peopling the world after the flood for 350 years until Noah had died or to have required that his sons ask him for permission to lie with their wives if this re-peopling were to begin during his lifetime-seeing as Noah himself is not recorded as having contributed to the task with new children of his own (I 33). God cannot have a preference for absolute monarchy, for Locke knows that population growth requires the development of the arts and sciences and these do not flourish under absolute monarchy (I 33). It is daft to think that the creatures stood in fear only of Noah but not of his sons, so Gen. 9:2 could not have been addressed to him alone (I 34). Locke cannot comprehend that an absolute monarch should be denied the right to eat his property, so the fact that Adam could not eat meat implies that he was no absolute monarch (I 39).
Indeed, only in the first part of the chapter following his introductory remarks, when
Locke is addressing the question of whether Gen. 1:28 granted dominion over human beings (I 25-28), does he make even a show of an attempt to submit to the words of Scripture in interpreting Scripture, and there it seems his point was merely to spring a trap for such humble literalism. Locke adopts the canons of interpretation that he does there for no other reason than that one must adopt the premises of one's opponent in order to subject them to a reductio ad absurdum.
Locke's response to orthodox opposition
Locke's procedure in the middle and especially at the end of chapter four is vulnerable to an orthodox and eminently respectable objection. In order to interpret the Bible in light of what seems reasonable as he does, one must presume that the Bible is nothing but the word of reason in the form of revelation. Locke's affirming this is an insufficient reply, for it ignores or even denies the possibility that the Bible is supra-rational or that it reveals things that cannot be known by natural reason alone. A revelation that simply repeated natural theology would be superfluous, at least for the best human beings, while perfect beings do nothing superfluous and the Bible claims to be useful for all-indeed, that the beginning of wisdom is fear of the LORD and thus that there simply is no "natural" path to genuine wisdom. One cannot meet this challenge by prefacing one's affirmation that reason is man's "only Star and compass" (I 58) with a scandalous tale of Peruvians eating babies (cf. I 57).
Locke deals with this challenge in several ways. First, and his main strategy, is not to draw attention to this problem so that the careless reader who is amenable to his political project can just go along with the flow of passing pages. But for the demanding reader (or, the demanding reader who is not predisposed to be revolted by Locke's political project) Locke has a dual message. Which message is received depends entirely upon how receptive he is to Locke's ultimate message.
Locke puts submissive literalism to the test in order to show its impossibility. The application of such canons of interpretation as this submission to biblical authority suggests means that Gen. 1:28 should be phrased in clear terms, and we find such terms in Gen. 1:20- Locke further makes the Bible appear more coherent than it is, lying about its content such that the above problem is clear and relatively easy to follow. He emphasizes the importance of the Bible's coherence and makes one certain that it simply must be that wayGen. 1:28 simply must speak in the categories established in Gen. 1:20-25, lest it be vague where clarity is required, such as in positive grants. He builds up this expectation and validates the moral impulse behind it. He thus prepares some readers to be suitably aghast when they turn to the Bible's actual text to verify what he says. Locke has set a trap for those motivated by the deep, orthodox piety he exhibits at the start of chapter four.
Locke's promotion of liberal Christianity
One could say that this reductio of biblical literalism is Locke's message to the most probing of his careful readers. We can say that those who are favorable to Locke's politics are not a problem. Some will detect scriptural irregularities, others will not; some will think themselves biblical literalists, others will hew to a more liberal reading. Still, they are unlikely to abandon the political system they favor because an anonymous author supported it badly or write a public exposé of an anonymous fellow-traveler's shocking impiety. At worst, they will just not commend the Two Treatises to people.
Rather, Locke's argument is directed at his persuadable readers, those who are hesitant would be difficult to tell the difference between serious and frivolous accusations of atheism. It would certainly be easy for anyone sympathetic to the Lockean political project to dismiss them all as hostile slanderers, either to themselves or to others.
I close by noting that, while something like Locke's gambit would be necessary to place the moral critique of biblical religion upon solid ground, Locke himself does not succeed in this.
The premise of his argument, on whatever level we take it, is that the grant of dominion in Gen.
1:28 is of enduring concern, that it is a command to contemporary readers of the Bible. It is does not seem necessary to take it this way. Precisely if Filmer is wrong about that verse then it -35 -does not bear on human obedience to God. Locke would not be repeating the details of Spinoza's higher criticism, but the textual critique I attribute to him would be open to the same objection: both rely on the claim that they do not understand what they think they should understand and that the text must therefore be senseless.
The success or failure of Locke's critique aside, however, its presence demonstrates that there is not a religious foundation to his political thought. He thinks it is the work of natural reason and as such of universal applicability. Locke does not think that he speaks of "Western" rights or that he defends a parochially post-Christian political settlement, but rather that the natural rights of man as such demand liberalism.
